Why China and Japan are improving relations

China and Japan are currently undertaking a reproachment in relations.

The thaw between the two historically embittered, yet deeply integrated, Asian countries started two months ago when Shigeru Ishiba became prime minister, but lost the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) majority in the subsequent snap election, an outcome which is extremely rare for Japan's ruling party.

Since that time, Ishiba has been open to improving ties with Beijing, and vice versa. First, he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in the G20 Summit. Then, notably, concessions were made over the hotly disputed Diaoyu Islands in order to ease tensions. Now, as reported by Reuters, the two will undertake mutual foreign minister visits. Tokyo has also issued a special 10-year visa in order to attract Chinese tourists. Amidst these moves, the Global Times has proclaimed in an official editorial: "Now is the right time for China-Japan relations to improve and develop."

The decision to mutually improve relations ends a deterioration in relations which started in 2020 amidst the COVID-19 pandemic with Tokyo having hardened its stance against Beijing dramatically in line with America's shift against Beijing.

During that time, Japan strenuously deepened its ties with Washington which included an expansion of the bilateral military alliance through a new joint command, as well as integration into other regional alliance models such as the Quad, or the "Squad" with the Philippines and of course actively promoting the cause of "Taiwan independence." It was widely assessed that Japan, driven by its desire to revive itself as a Great Power once again, believed the containment of China was in its greatest interests.

In conjunction with these developments, anti-Japanese nationalism in China also surged, with historical issues making it very easy to flare up. Now, however, the decision has been made to bilaterally improve relations, but one must ask surely, why now? What is behind this uneasy shift?

First, the geopolitical context has changed. The Trump administration is returning to office, a presidency which is famously geopolitically unpredictable, unreliable, and also an "enemy to all" on matters to trade. Trump generally pursues a unilateralist foreign policy, which thus pressures Tokyo to balance its relations with China accordingly.

In many areas, Tokyo will not seriously change its policies and will still seek to "compete" with China, but at the same time this competition must balance itself out with a regional co-existence and a vast economic integration. Although there is concern that China's rapid technological development is wiping out a place for Japanese products, China nonetheless remains Japan's largest market and economic partner.

Second, the return of Trump means that China must prioritize diplomacy as its primary foreign policy strategy. It is a given that the Trump administration will, as per the above, pursue an escalated trade war against Beijing with escalated tariffs and likely be aggressive on a host of other fronts.

For China, mitigating the Trump risk involves deepening its economic ties with others and making concessions accordingly to reduce America's diplomatic influence over those respective countries. This strategy did not work as easily against the Biden administration's more robust multilateralism, but it did bring many benefactors in the first Trump era. From Tokyo's perspective, this is also an opportunity to win favorable concessions from China.

Third, the hope for US-South Korea-Japan trilateralism has shattered with the rapid political demise of Yoon Seok-Yeol in Seoul. Yoon pushed a pro-Japanese foreign policy in South Korea that sought to fit Washington's preferences. However, his bizarre and botched imposition of martial law has accumulated in his impeachment from office. This makes it likely that there will be an election next year which the Democratic Party will probably win, heralding the return of a foreign policy more amicable to Beijing, and thus stoking anti-Japanese nationalism as Moon Jae-In did.

In such a layout, Japan faces isolation, especially if it seeks reassurances in regards to North Korea which is to them becoming problematically stronger owing to the role of Russia, both of who Trump will be keen to try and reproach with in limited circumstances. Thus, Tokyo must be "in the game" in order to win it and can geopolitically balance all these factors out, and thus the stage is set for the national interests of both parties to re-engage in unlikely circumstances.

(The author, a postgraduate student of Chinese studies at Oxford University, is an English analyst on international relations. The views are his own.)